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EDITORS NOTE: What is the nature of a military manager/commander and how does he differ from 
his civilian counterpart? Hopefully, that question has crossed the thoughts of every officer. 
The thoughts of one man, James H. Toner, as presented in the feature article should be of 
interest to all of us. Mr. Toner, an OCS graduate, has served in the U.S. Army Reserve and 
is now a doctoral student in the Department of Government and International Studies at the 
University of Notre Dame. This long article, which appeared in the December, 1974 issue of 
Military Review, should provide a focus for thought for all of us. 
FEATURE ARTICLE: THE MILITARY ETHIC: ON THE VIRTURE OF AN ANACHRONISM 
"While, even in recent years, few would dispute the judgment of John Jay in the third 
of the Federalist Papers that 'among the many objects to which a wise and free people find 
it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the 
first,' the debate over the nature and role of the American defense forces has, nonetheless, 
reached a fever pitch. Critics of the military have cited individual instances of misconduct 
or criminality as proof of the decadence of the entire military establishment, and they find 
numerous examples of alleged usurpation of the civilian prerogative. But the fear of the 
military subversion of the civilian governmental and business superstructure is hardly novel. 
There has been the lurking suspicion that there is an insidious partnership between the 
military and the 'merchants of death.' And, in 1961, of course, President Eisenhower sup-
plied the label for the partnership: the military-industrial complex. 
In the wake of the Vietnam War, a new kind of 'Seven Days in May mentality' has pervaded 
intellectual circles: Although the military is no longer thought to be ready to stage a 
coup d'etat, it is regard as a self-serving political powerhouse whose leaders are almost 
solely concerned with advancing their careers, or testing new weaponry, or experimenting 
with new techniques or programs, invariably at the expense of others' lives and needlessly 
staged battles. 
Despite the importance of defense issues, they rarely enjoy wide public appeal. In 
order to understand military affairs today, the average concerned citizen has to comprehend 
terms that even seasoned political analysts or professional military officers may find 
bewildering. Confronted with the omnipresent military acronym and asked to grasp the 
elusive concepts of deterrence, the citizen is understandably anxious to leave military 
affairs in the hands of the 'experts' and direct his attention to matters apparently more 
~~levant to his daily life. If the vogue is criticism of the military, one may expect the 
purveyors of what is known in sociology as 'mass culture' to produce the kind of entertain-
ment or literature that caters to public taste without necessarily contributing anything of 
substance to public awarenesS . 
The problem of providing for an objective analysis of the military is not solved even 
on the plane of scholarship. In the past few years, unhappily, a 'military expert' is 
anyone who proclaims himself to be one . Much of the recent academic literature concerned 
with deterrence theory has been a mere exercise in which academicians compete with one 
another to develop the snappiest shibboleth to describe a hard fact of military and 
strategic life. 'Because the professional military will have no part of this word-gaming.' 
Arthur G. B. Metcalf recently observed, 'the defense intellectual has built a world in 
which war is waged to the exclusion o'f the military!' 
The recent emphasis on peace research, while a commendable enterprise, has as its concern 
the elimination of war through international and intellect~~l devices rather than the 
preservation of peace through the prudent employment of military potential. Although 
balanced scholarship calls for effort in the complementary areas of peace research and 
military affairs, the student interested in national security policy today finds himself 
increasingly surrounded by a literature produced only by academicians who may be, in some 
instances, unaware of the exigencies of military operations, or wholly unappreciative of 
the military ethic. Instead of addressing problems of national security with a common 
purpose, military and civilian writers too often have written for audiences of antagonistic 
sympathies; an intellectual Gresham's law seems to have prevailed, and polemics have driven 
responsible discussion out of circulation. 
While the military ethic may be an anachronism in the popular-or even in the academic-
mind, it is in fact the very essence of military professionalism. Based upon the premise 
that it is civilianism rather than militarism that constitutes a threat to the security 
of the nation, this article holds that there is, and ought to be, an irresolvable tension 
between the civilian and military communities, and that efforts to achieve an integration 
of the two are mistaken and counterproductive. In the hope of maintaining that civil-
military tension, but of assuaging the possibilities of friction, the article concludes 
with a modest proposal. 
I. CIVILIANISM 
Regardless of the many species of charges against the armed forces, the genus of 
those charges is, in a word, militarism. Alfred Vagts has pointed out that the term can 
mean far more than the dbvious triumph of facist values. Militarism can also mean: 
.•. ~he ~mpo~~on on heavy b~de~ on a people n04 ~any pU4pO~~, ~o ~he 
neglect on welnMe and c.uU:U4e, and ~he w~~e On ~e nation'~ b~~ manpowe4 ~n unpM-
duc:Uve a4my ~e4v~c.e. 
As all economics students are expected to grasp quickly, the maintenance of defense 
forces (guns) is achieved at the price not simply of so many billions of dollars, but in 
terms of other services or commodities (butter). It is this economic fact of life which 
has led a number of critics of the military to attempt to set new tasks for the military--
to invest the armed forces with a social welfare mission--in order to ensure that the 
military 'pays its own way.' As a result of the usual civilian antipathy toward the 
military, and the relatively recent efforts of reformers to make the military 'socially 
responsible,' a new force has arisen within the military establishment which appears to 
be on the threshold of transforming the military ethic. 
Although a democratic government must guard against the dangers of militarism, it must, 
at the same time, ensure that its military does not become civilianized. Colonel Richard 
Rosser, for instance, has recently written that the advanced, democratic societies of the 
West may well be entering an era of civilianism. 'Civilianism' may be understood according 
to a three-part formula: an emphasis on the interest of the individual, a democratic 
egalitarianism, and a deliberate or judiCial decisionmaking process. The military, by 
contrast, emphasizes the interest of the organization, a hierarchical structure and an 
authoritarian or command decision-making process. While civilian influence surely can help 
make the military more cordial to society, civilianism may seriously impair the efficiency 
or dependability of the military. 
The image of the old, nonprogressive military is a mistaken one. In fact, by employing 
the modernization techniques of centralization, the secular approach, technology and 
adaptability, the military establishment has transformed itself into one of the most 
modern institutionsin the world. But, as James M. Roherty has recently written, the tools 
of modern management may occasionally be incongruous in the military setting: 
Se.;t.U.ng ~he gow an mili:tMy planMng, wUfUn a nlUlmeuJoJc.k. on ove4aU national 
po.eJ..tic.al gow, ~ c.e.n.t:Jtai. ~o rn.LU:t.any pMn~~Mn~m; P40V~Mng a ~~u on aUe4na.Uve 
meaM n04 ~he ac.hleveme~ an rnil..-Uo.Jr.y gow ~ wo c.e~ ~o mftUany PMn~~~O~m. 
The/l.e ~ no ~uemMc. bct6~ n04 ~uppo~~g ~h~ ~e uv~n analy.6~ hM ~UP~4 04 
. ( 
even c.ampMable c.4ede~ n04 ~uc.h ~k.6. Yu, ~~OnM ~ ~e p4e~~ and ~e ~eJun.6 
On ~he dene~e fuc.o~e Me ~u by , ~op managemen~' , ... ~he Mle On ~e analy~~ ~h4e~e~ 0 
a ~eve4e deJtangeme~ On ~he uvil-~y ~:tIt..uc.:tu4e. 
To the extent that the military forces become permeated by civilianism, we may expect 
military officers to pursue their careers with the same avidity that marks the professional 
advancement of many of their civilian counterparts. The crucial distinction, of course, 
is that military officers occasionally find themselves in positions in which reckless 
careerism jeopardizes the lives of subordinates. Yet the cure for this infection of military 
leadership consists not so much in increased civilianism, as some have urged, but, rather, 
in a restored professionalism. As General Matthew Ridgway once spelled out: 
... a c.orrrnandeJt hct6 ct6 deep a duty ~o ~he men w.i;th wh0.6e uv~ he ~ ~empOJr..aM...e.y 
~u6~ed ct6 ~hey have ~o hlm--and p~ on ~~ duty ~ ~o ~ee ~h~ ~h0.6e liv~ Me no~ 
needl~~ly ~qUMde4ed. 
The desire of any person to advance his career is an understandable and perfectly 
legitimate interest. But, when personal interest becomes someone's sole focus of concern, 
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the organization of which he is a part, whether it be a business corporation, a university 
or a military service, becomes the loser. The control of excessive careerism is not to be 
found in demands for total loyalty to the organization iteself, or in a reformulation of 
the officer efficiency report program. Rather, it consists in adherence to a code of 
honor and a system of professional ethics that cannot be enforced by the organization so 
much as it must be individually assimilated by the professional themselves. In the 
military, the code of honor is contained in one injunction: 'Accomplishment of the Mission-
Welfare of the Men.' The cure for military careerism, then, is not less professionalism, 
but more. 
Unhappily, however, the prospects for the full return of military pride and esprit 
seem slim. In fact, many career military men seem already to have acceded to the new 
civilian ethic, effectively obviating the need for critics of the military to seek to 
impose their standard upon the Armed Forces. As the comparatively 'luxurious' field 
operations in Vietnam and the caserns of Europe amply testify, the military may well be 
ready to civilianize iteself. As John Sack put it: 
.. . the AmvUc.a.n walj 06 li6e pa.c.fla.ge.& eMillj--Ia.nd) -i.6 g-i.ven enou.gh c.oJ[)U.Lgated 
-6tee..t c.onta.-i.neN.J the qu.aJr.teJU7la6teJl.. C.Oll.pJ.J c.a.n deliveJl.. U to the a.nt-Lpode.& .... 
The problem of determining the proper ration between 'tail' and 'teeth' is not an easy 
one to solve, especially if, as Lieutenant Colonel Edward King has charged, austerity has 
become a forgotten word, or if, as Adam Yarmolinsky has written, 'In the new military 
establishment, military executives behave more and more like civilians.' 
But 'luxurious' military installations are not so much the cause of civilianism as the 
effect. In the new military, innovations include 'boss lines,' junior officer councils, 
enlisted men's councils and race relations councils. Commanders can be, and often are, 
rated according to their unit's financial participation in various charity drives or 
according to their own attendance at battalion or brigade social functions. The business 
management practices now employed in the higher echelons of the Defense Department are 
presently taught, in simplified forms, of course, to junior officers and noncommissioned 
officers. Although these new developments would be of certain value in the business 
corporation, in some circumstances they can be at odds with traditional military values 
and even counterproductive to the accomplishment of the military mission. 
Yet the problem is not limited to the military's own efforts to civilianize or 'modern-
ize' iteself. Civilian leaders have been more than eager to assist. One admiral, for 
instance, recently complained that: 
.. . the Na.vlj -i.J.J bung J.Jwai1.owed up -i.n the 6a.c.e..teM bWt.ea.u.CJta.c.1j 06 the Ve6eMe 
Vepa.Jd.ment. Wh-Lz fl-i.d6 a.nd c.omputeN.J Me ta.Ung OVeJl.. the job 06 JuLnn-i.ng the .6h-i.p6 at 
-6 ea.. 
The Cuban missile crisis set a pattern that has been followed, much to the chagrin of 
some professional military men, in subsequent military actions. As Graham Allison wrote, 
during the naval quarantine of Cuba: 
... 60ll. the 6~t time -i.n u.s. milUa.Jt1j h-i.J.Jtoll.lj, ioc.al c.omma.ndeN.J ll.ec.uved 
1!.epea.ted Oll.deM a.bout the deta.ilJ.J 06 the-i.Jt milUa.Jt1j opeJta.tioM cUll.ec.:ti1j 6ll.om politic.at 
iea.deM-c.ontJtaJz.1j to two J.Ja.c.Jted mil-i.ta!l.1j doc.tJt-i.ne.&. Th-i.J.J c.-i.1tc.u.mvention 06 the c.ha-Ln 
06 c.otmla.nd a.nd the a.c.c.ompanlj-i.ng c.ou.ntVl..ma.nd 06 the a.utomonlj 06 ioc.al c.ommandeJt.6 
c.Jteated enotunou.J.J pa.-i.n and J.JvUOuA 6Jt-i.c.tion. 
Samuel Huntington's well-known formula of 'objective control', which aims at a re-
inforcement of military values and culture while ensuring proper deference to the civil 
authority, should be the policy desideratum for American society. Yet, in present 
cicumstances, we seem more and more to be embracing the idea of 'subjective control' 
of the military whereby it is required to assimilate civilian standards. In light of 
Huntington's admonition that the civil society customarily attempts either to extirpate 
or transmute military values, there appears to be ample reason for serious concern about 
the further erosion of mili tar), professionalism. Should the trend continue, 'civilian 
control' may well become a euphemism for civilian dominance. 
II. THE TWO TENSIONS 
Even junior military leaders quickly learn that theirs is a twofold reponsibility: to 
accomplish their miss ion and t o provide for the welfare of their men. While this is the 
only code of honor that soldiers need, there really is nothing unusual about it. Any 
leader, civilian or military, can be said to have a similar duty: to do his job and to 
assist his subordinates. It is only in the military, however, in which one aspect of that 
responsibility can conflict absolutely with the other. The best illustration of this 
leadership dilemma is the example of Commander Lloyd Bucher. As captain of the PUEBLO, 
Bucher was confronted with a cruel choice: Would he surrender his ship to the North Koreans 
or resist-possibly at the price of the deaths of his men? 
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Bucher surrendered. He reasoned that any attempt to resist would be futile and would 
result in the needless deaths of his crewmen. Similarly, he believed that any effort to 
run would be fruitless and that the North Koreans would sink the PUEBLO. Thus, Bucher chose 
to regard the welfare of his men as more important than the accomplishment of his mission 
which at that time, had become the responsibility of preventing the search and seizure of 
his ship by the North Korean Armed Forces. 
Those not on board the PUEBLO in January 1968 and those who are not naval experts can 
hardly hope to judge the actions of Commander Bucher. After all, Bucher was the captain, 
the man on the spot, and the ultimate decision-and responsibility-were his alone. Yet, 
und~tood a6 pnincipie, Bucher's decision to surrender appears to have been the wrong 
one. Whereas a civilian should have chosen as Bucher did, a military man's first impulse 
must be to the accomplishment of the mission, and second to the welfare of his men. Were 
it to be otherwise, any military operation involving a risk would not be undertaken, and 
in fact the military forces could be dispensed with. It is necessary to add the caveat 
that, in some circumstances, to increase or to continue military operations can be so 
obviously futile that only a madman would choose such a course. American servicemen are 
permitted to surrender when they no longer have the means to resist-a phrase, as in Commander 
Bucher's case, that is and must be vague at best. But the principle of the m~~ion n~t 
is, within the confines of common sense and the call of duty, the very core of the military 
ethic. It is also a professional military imperative that most of civilian society cannot 
be expected to understand or agree with. 
The tension between the two duties of leadership pales by comparison with the tension 
between military and civil society. There is no clearer example of this tension than that 
provided by Joel Jay Finder, an attorney, who became convinced that the Navy's Board of 
Inquiry, convened to examine the seizure of the PUEBLO, was a cruel and tormenting inquisition 
Finer strenuously objected to an examination of the seizure by a board of naval officers. 
He thought it outrageous that Bucher's professional colleagues would be charged with conduct-
ing the inquiry, and argued that a group of selected civilians could have investigated with 
equal competence and with greater compassion. But Finer is wrong precisely because he fails 
to recognize the distinction between the military and civilian communities. Attempting to 
evaluate or judge military discipline or a military mission from a civilian point of view is 
a senseless exercise. Civilians may suffer hardships and they may even risk their lives, 
but, ordinarily, they will do so only when they expect immediate personal gain from their 
actions. The circumstances in which military personnel often find themselves, however, 
rarely permit actions calculated to achieve mere personal advantage. And military 
proficiency, discipline, morale and esprit-factors always best judged by professional 
military men-are the means to the end of mission accomplishment. No civilian can be 
expected to understand the military Weltanschauung, and no civilian can be (or should be) 
expected to judge alleged departures from it. The rationale for the Board of Inquiry 
was beyond Finer's ken. And the thought of a court-martial of Commander Bucher (as the 
board recommended) was virtually unthinkable in a liberal society that was, and not without 
reason, persu~ded not only of Bucher's innocence, but of his heroism. 
Although Huntington's The Soldie~ and the State: The Theo~y and PolitiC6 on Civil 
Mitit~y Retatio~ is the classic examination of the tension rretweenthe military establish-
ment and the society of which it is a part, he is mistaken in writing that 'the emergence 
of a conservative environment in the United States would reduce the danger of progressive 
deterioration in American officership.' One does not change a country's social ethos in 
order to make its military leaders more comfortable or even to lessen the burdens of their 
office. S.L.A. Marshall has written: 
... to the ex;tent that ~y men lo~ e the...iJt naith in (~cipUne' ~) v~e and 
bec.ome amenable to ill-c.o~id~ed ~e60Jun6 ~imply to appea6e the public., :they ~elinq~h the 
powe~ to pILoted (:th~ ~oci.ety) .... 
The tension between a liberal society and a conservative military is not undesirable. 
It is in fact a highly advantageous and healthful situation which has the single drawback 
of requiring constant vigilance and adjustment-like a checks and balances system-to ensure 
the complete triumph of neither militarism nor civilianism. As Janowitz put it: 
To deny o~ dv.:.tMy the din6~enc.e between the rnilA.;to.Jz.y and the uvilian 
c.annot pMduc.e genuine ~irnil..aJr.A.ty, but ~M the wk. 06 c.~eating new nOJun6 06 
teMion and unantici..pa.ted rn<LU~m. 
III. A MODEST PROPOSAL 
Reform in the military, and the introduction of new programs and purposes, should be 
predicated on one criterion: Will the anticipated change help the military to become a 
more effective fighting force? Even critic Peter Barnes has recognized that 'the Army is 
not a social agency, and its involvement in domestic 'nation-building' could lead to 
political trouble.' 
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This does not exclude, however, what Morris Janowitz, in the 1971 prologue to his 
classic work The P~one6~ional Soldi~: A Social and Politieal Po~, has called 
'secondary functions' of the military. While the primary goal of the military is either 
to fight or to prepare to fight, the military can no longer be content with that as its 
only goal. The success of Project 100,000, Projection Transition and similar programs is 
convincing evidence that the military can perform an educational and vocational service 
both to society at large and to its own branches by accepting, training and offering 
meaningful employment to those Americans formerly considered to be unfit for military 
service. 
Although one out of every 10 men who enters the Army at Fort Dix, New Jersey, is a 
functional illiterate who cannot pass a fifth-grade reading test, Lieutenant General L. E. 
Benade, the Defense Department's senior military manpower policy official, has said of 
non-high school graduates that often they: 
••. Me {Ughly motiva.-ted. They dlr.opped out in many eMU beeaU.6e on eeonomie 
neeu~i:ty. They wdeome the oppo~UJ'lA.;U.~ On the ~~viee to buil.d a eMe~ and make 
ex.eeUent membVL6 0 n aU b~anehu 0 n the Mmed no~eu. 
The success of vocational programs like Project 100,000 and the ability of the military 
to motivate and train educationally deprived personnel underscore the mistaken limitation 
currently imposed on military recruiting according to which, by Congressional order, the 
Army must ensure that at least 55 percent of its recruits hold high school diplomas. 
While the military has demonstrated its capability for effective training and efficient 
manpower employment of recruits, it still fails to use its experienced personnel to maximum 
advantage. Retirement of the most experienced soldiers at the beginning of their most-
productive years is as poor an administrative practice as is the 'up or out' program 
which overlooks the many advantages of retaining in service those soldiers who may be 
superb workmen but inadequate supervisors. (Perhaps there is something to be said in 
this regard for the Peter Principle!) 
Although lengthy discussion of these problems is not possible here, one 'modest proposal' 
about personnel may be advanced. Colonel Rosser has recently indicated his displeasure 
with the tendency of the academies and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps to train their 
cadets as officers first and as specialists second. He proposes, instead, the development 
of self-contained corps of specialists recruited and maintained for military duty. This 
concept may hint at the problem, but it does not provide a viable answer. Encouraging 
technicians to wear civilian suits and to try to convince themselves that they are not 
really in the military does not contribute to the formulation of answers to contemporary 
military problems. 
A better solution appears to be the development of a tripartite corps of personnel, 
based on the line-staff distinction. According to this formula, line officers (Janowitz' 
heroic leaders) would serve their full careers as combat officers, entitled to the various 
awards, bonuses and attractions of the combat arms. Staff officers (Janowitz' managers) 
would serve as combat support and logistics officers during their entire careers. Such 
career groupings, independent in themselves, controlled by officers of similar career 
patterns and permitting the maximum employment of both military experience and military 
education, could restore to the profession of arms the pride and full feeling of 
accomplishment that would effectively obviate thoughts of retirement 'after 20.' 
A third grouping, to use Rosser's term, the 'generalists,' might not be military at all. 
This group of executives would be the civilianized 'officer corps' of administrators, 
chaplains, doctors, lawyers, university professors and educators that would perform 
military duties clearly not of a combat or direct combat support nature. Advancement in 
the generalist category would be controlled according to guidelines established by its 
own authorities. And, most importantly, those soldiers now engaged in 'extra-military' 
activities could be released to service in more specialized military spheres. The 
administration of needed secondary activities, moreover, might well be directed by this 
corps of generalists. 
The precise consti tuti on of this idea, or that of any other recently suggested organizati-
onal innovation, require such elaborate discussion and study that a new Gates Commission 
or a Congressional committee might be established. A committee of this type would serve 
~ a ~learing house for organizational ideans and criticisms, some which might be of 
1nest1mable value in helping to solve contemporary military problems. 
But the sole guideline for any proposed reform must be one of helping the military 
return to the status of 'objective control,' of helping to restore dignity to the term 
'serviceman,' and of helping to re-create that commendable pride in service that was 
displayed by General Ridgway as he retired from active duty. In his June 1955 letter to 
the Secretary of Defense, Ridgway said: 
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1:t ha..6 been my pJtoud p4i.vilege zo have been 0. me.mbu 06 Zhat". mo.giU.Mc.e.n;t 
.{.n6.ti.:tu.tio n. - -The. UnLte.d S:ttLtu kmy. 
Whether the military establishment is based upon a voluntary, a universal service or a 
mixed system, it must aim at a full restoration of military pride and professionalism and 
at the preservation of that virtuous anachronism, the military ethic. 1t 
HELP WANTED! The Barometer is in need of an editor. If you think that you would 
like to help seek out and edit items of professional interest for publication drop a 
note in SMC 1181, SMC 1088 or call Eric Benson at 372-5498. 
